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This article highlights some facts and fallacies about globalization, with a par-
ticular reference to the global economy. To explain what is globalization and 
what it is not is critical both theoretically and practically for nations, corpo-
rations, and communities to benefit from it and avoid its negative conse-
quences. Some historical antecedents of globalization and the interactive na-
ture of its structures and processes are highlighted in this article. The analy-
sis is expected to benefit scholars, practitioners, and agents of social change 
interested and involved directly or indirectly in the impacts and processes of 
globalization. 
Keywords: globalization, Bretton Woods conference, global economy, global 
culture, culture of consumerism, digital divide, the Internet, economic and po-
litical hegemony.  
Four Common Fallacies about Globalization 
The literature on globalization is loaded with some erroneous assumptions and miscon-
ceptions that mislead the reader about its true nature and implications for nations and 
groups affected by it. The following discussion focusing on four ‘common fallacies of 
globalization’ is intended to correct these assumptions and misconceptions. 
Fallacy one (F1): Globalization started in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference 
(in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA) and with the establishment of the so-
called Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
 
Fallacy two (F2): Globalization is a unilinear process commandeered largely by 
American and European political and corporate leaders who are masters of the 
situation while the rest of the world plays to their tune. 
 
Fallacy three (F3): Globalization means global economy per se. 
 
Fallacy four (F4): Globalization is either an unmitigated boon or a bane for huma-
nity and society. 
Contradicting the Above-mentioned Fallacies 
CF1: The following quotation is a strong contradiction of Fallacy 1 that globalization 
started with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944. 
For thousands of years before Bretton Woods, before the birth of telecommu-
nications, even before the birth of Jesus Christ, individuals, groups, and na-
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tions had been interacting with each other in war and peace, as warriors, am-
bassadors, travelers, and traders. Chinese and Indian merchants sold silk, 
pearls and spices in South and Central Asia and Europe and brought with 
them Eastern knowledge to the West. Many centuries later, Western technol-
ogy, along with foreign opium and opium smoking habits, were introduced 
into China by the Dutch and the English (adapted from Ahmad 2004). 
This refers to ancient history. In more recent times, the colonial period preceding 
the Second World War witnessed massive movements of knowledge, technology, goods 
and services from the West to the East and from the North to the South. In a reverse 
movement, natural resources flowed from the East to the West and from the South to 
the North to start the engines of industrialization and support warfare in Europe  
and America. Cultural interactions accompanied these two-way transfers. Politically and 
economically exploitative as these exchanges might have been, they were the precur-
sors of the more recent currents of globalization (see, e.g., MacGillivray 2006; Chanda 
2007).   
CF2: The following brief reasoning contradicts Fallacy 2 that globalization in the con-
temporary world society is a one-way street. 
This discussion dovetails into the one preceding it in that contemporary globaliza-
tion is also a multidirectional phenomenon like its predecessor although in far greater 
measures and manners. No single country or corporation is in the driver's seat anymore. 
The exclusive club of G7 or G8 has now been expanded to include 20 newly industrial-
ized or industrializing economies (NIEs), the group of G20. More than a quarter of the 
world's largest economies are non-western. China has already overtaken Germany as 
the second largest industrial nation posing a threat to the economic hegemony of the 
United States although the gap between the two is still very large (Engardio 2007). In-
dustrial and business transactions between China and the rest of the world are increas-
ing rapidly, particularly with the United States, Australia, and in the African and Latin 
regions.  
The combined GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – is 
larger than the entire European GDP. The American economy suffered a major setback 
during 2008 and 2009 and continued to struggle through 2011. Major European econo-
mies, including Iceland, Britain, Germany, Greece, Spain and others went through simi-
lar ordeals of huge budget deficits, belt tightening, cost cutting, investment slashing, 
job losses, reduced public services, and popular unrest and mistrust of private and pub-
lic institutions – unmistakable indicators of their declining economic, and consequently, 
political power. The old masters of the world suffered the 2008–2009 recessions with 
much pain and anxiety (Zakaria 2008; Lorca-Susino 2010). The NIEs, most of them 
with relative degrees of centralization, came out of it rather unscathed. Of all the Euro-
pean countries, Germany alone remarkably turned around its economy through manu-
facturing and export of high quality small and big machines like their Stihl chainsaws, 
BMWs, and Mercedes. More automobiles are now sold in China than in the United 
States.  
The controlled economies learned through trial and error that too many restrictions 
on private initiative and ownership are counter-productive. China is the best example of 
communism turned on its head. It is often called, somewhat euphemistically though,  
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the most capitalist communist country in the world. India offers a similar example of 
turnaround from what used to be called the ‘License Raj’ for restrictive business poli-
cies to a relatively open-door policy for private initiatives and investment from within 
and outside the country. 
On the contrary, the freer market economies are adopting some ways and means 
used by the command economies to bolster economic well-being, such as better man-
agement of the money supply, publicly funded infrastructural developments, and bail 
out of failing private banks and companies like the GM and Chrysler in America.  
The universal trend seems to be moving in the mixed-economy direction taking a queue 
from the likes of Sweden and Denmark in Europe and Brazil, India, and China outside 
the western hemisphere. Dollar, the gold standard of currencies for the past one hun-
dred years, is competing with euro and the British pound. It may not be long before the 
Chinese and other developing countries' currencies join the ranks of the existing ‘hard’ 
currencies. 
Declining economic imperialism is accompanied by declining political and cultural 
imperialism as well. The superpower hegemony of the United States and the (then) So-
viet Union has been replaced by the rising political clout of the NIEs. Islam and Hindu-
ism are today the world's second and third largest religions according to the number of 
their followers. Together with Buddhism, they surpass Christianity by close to half 
a billion followers. These competing belief systems are profoundly affecting the cul-
tural landscape in the globalizing world. Christians eat almost everything that walks, 
crawls, swims, or flies barring a few exceptions. Chinese eat everything and anything 
living regardless. Muslims and Jews do not eat pork, about the only thing they share 
with each other in addition to the ritual of kosher meat and circumcision. Hindus are 
largely vegetarians; but some Hindus eat eggs, chicken, maybe even mutton. Buddhists 
and Jains do not touch any living thing for food. Through migration and the Internet the 
cuisine, dress, demeanor, arts and artifacts influenced by these diverse religious and 
ethnic traditions have found expression in lands far beyond their origins. An increasing 
number of people, particularly the younger generations everywhere, are learning to 
taste the cuisines and styles from cultures other than their own. While American life-
styles are very popular in many parts of the world, the Americans also begin to increas-
ingly experience and appreciate the cuisines and cultures from other countries (Berger 
and Huntington 2002; Watson 2006). 
The United States, Canada, India, and much of Europe today are melting pots of 
these diverse cultures. Cultural diversity in Europe is nowhere more visible than in 
England and France. Some of the best and the worst Chinese, Indian, and Mexican res-
taurants are found in these countries. Some of the best Indian food is served in the 
‘English’ and ‘Australian’ restaurants. Cricket has replaced football (soccer) as  
the most popular sport in India. Hollywood films are universally popular. Bollywood 
music is appreciated throughout the Middle East and Africa. Nine out of ten taxi drivers 
in New York City, Minneapolis or Toronto is an Indian, Iranian, Pakistani, Somali, or 
somewhere from outside the United States or Canada. Dozens of languages and dialects 
are spoken in the streets of major American, Canadian, and English cities. English is 
the most common cross-cultural medium of communication within and across nations 
(Ahmad 2010: ch. 7). 
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The forces of globalization – spread of science and technology, non-monopolistic 
nature of economic power, cross-cultural dissemination of lifestyles, arts and artifacts, 
including music, movies, and the media – are responsible for the dissipation of political 
hegemonies and oligarchic regimes. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a wel-
come jolt to the superpower rivalry leaving the United States as the only superpower. 
That was some twenty or so years ago. With the rising military power of Russia, China, 
India, and other nuclearising nations, it is doubtful if there will be any one ‘super 
power’ in the near future. Along with their economies and cultures, global political and 
military systems would also get closely intertwined and interdependent on each other 
for their own survival as well as for world peace. Current uprisings in many parts of Af-
rica and the Middle East testify to this unfolding reality unforeseen by the spies and the 
futurists of the world alike. These uprisings, bloody and messy as they are, are also 
aided and abetted by free flow of information all across the world. In the longer run, 
they are likely to herald a new era of people power to replace authoritarianism and di-
minish tribal and religious bigotry and rivalries.     
The most powerful tool for globalization is the spread of knowledge, science, and 
technology (The Economist 2010: 92, 94). There was time when scientific ideas and in-
ventions flowed unidirectionally from the North to the South and from the West to the 
East for hundreds of years since the industrial revolution. The knowledge flows are 
now truly multidirectional. Europe and America remain highly creative knowledge cen-
ters but they are no longer the monopolistic powerhouses of creativity and innovation. 
Ideas come out of human minds in nurturing social and political environments. There 
used to be the so-called brain drain in the 1960s and 70s. The global brain trust of today 
is highly diverse and dispersed. India and China together produce more qualified scien-
tists and engineers per years than the United Sates, Europe, and the rest of the world 
combined. And lo and behold, they are staying in ever larger numbers in their home 
countries rather than migrating out in search of intellectual and professional fulfillment. 
Like the economic and political hegemonies, the hegemony of knowledge of older 
times is now on its last leg. Cultural and geographic diversification of knowledge crea-
tion and dissemination is a liberalizing force for otherwise subjugated peoples all over 
the world. 
Production of qualified scientists and engineers, particularly those employed in 
R&D, directly impacts a country's scientific and technological capacities. Per capita 
production of scientists and engineers in the West (particularly the USA) is still well 
ahead of the world average. But the total annual production in China and India sur-
passes the USA in about 4 to 1 ratio: USA = 84,898; India = 103,000; China = 
292,569 (India-China combined total = 395,569). These ratios are changing the na-
ture and extent of global technological capacities. The United States and the EU 
countries still have the largest share of global IT/R&D capacity. But their share is 
declining. Others like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and of late, In-
dia and China are catching up fast. 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore spend as much of their GDP percentage on 
R&D as the USA and more than most EU nations. Japan's R&D expenditure is running 
at 3+ per cent of GDP vs. the USA's 2+ per cent. Its industry R&D intensity is the sec-
ond after Sweden in the OECD region. Chinese R&D expenditure of 1.5 per cent of 
GDP surpasses most of the EU countries'; more than that of Japan for the first time, 
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$154 billion vs. $144 billion. China spends 6 per cent of GDP on information technol-
ogy (IT) development alone (next to India's 4 per cent) and employs 1.4 million quali-
fied scientists and engineers. It is the world's second highest R&D investor behind the 
United States. These science and technology indicators amply demonstrate globaliza-
tion, utilization, and transfer of knowledge on a scale unforeseen in world history (NSF 
2010). Along with the preceding information, they demolish the myth of hegemonic 
and unidirectional nature of globalization.  
CF3: The following discussion is meant to correct the impression that globalization 
means global economy per se. 
Globalization and global economy are quite often theoretically and analytically in-
distinguishable from each other in the extant literature on globalization (see, e.g., Head 
2003; Bhagwati 2004; Wolf 2005; Rivoli 2006; Meredith 2007). Global economy may 
indeed be the most pervasive and influential aspect of globalization but it is neither the 
beginning, nor the end, nor the all of it. To reduce globalization to global economy 
would tantamount to reductionism. The overall processes of globalization are indeed 
buffeted by a variety of economic trends, including national economic priorities, market 
fluctuations, and production systems; along with international trade, treaties, movement 
of money and natural resources. But globalization is a lot more than the global econ-
omy. It is shaped and reshaped by forces of an increasingly interdependent world in 
terms of political systems and governments, a globalizing culture of consumerism that 
feeds it and is fed by it, and the attitudes of mind which have come to accept, though 
sometimes reluctantly, the interconnections between the local and the global.  
We are living in a world where the political and social destinies of nations, as well 
as their economic destinies, are closely interlinked. No one could have foreseen two or 
so decades ago the dissolution of the Soviet Union, fall of the Berlin Wall, unification 
of Germany, the loosening grip of Communism on the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and Cuban economies; opening of markets to international technology, trade, and capi-
tal in erstwhile publicly controlled economies of India, China, Russia, and Brazil; and 
the rising tide of revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and other absolute monar-
chies and dictatorships in the Middle East and Africa. These developments would not 
be possible without significant change in political attitudes and yearnings in these re-
gions aided and abetted by rapid dissemination of global cultures and information 
through the cyber space.  
In the systemic reality of our contemporary world, it is generally quite difficult if 
not entirely impossible to separate the cause from its effect, and vice versa. And so is 
the case with the various subsystems of global society and the processes of change 
within them. The European Union is perhaps the best example of the interactive nature 
of socio-cultural, economic, and political forces among the EU's 27 member states 
(McCormick 2007; Pinder and Usherwood 2007). The impending economic bailout of 
Greece in the Euro zone is a prime example of the complex interplay of these forces. So 
is Turkey's exclusion from the EU. Here is an otherwise economically robust democ-
ratic country in the region being kept out of the EU because of cultural differences be-
tween an Islamic society and the Christian Europe although the staunchest among the 
opponents deny any such motives.   
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CF4: The following discussion argues that globalization (particularly the global econ-
omy) is neither an unmitigated boon nor a bane for all. 
A culture of consumerism has taken hold of the lifestyles of an increasing number 
of people throughout the world. This does not mean that there is no poverty or inequal-
ity among large sections of people in many countries. Global economy may be an in-
strument to increase the purchasing power of many within nations as well as to decrease 
economic disparity among nations. But it has also left many others behind, particularly 
those relatively unqualified to benefit from its largess – those without the endowments 
of education, inheritance, communicability or mobility (Head 2003). Multinational cor-
porations have set up shops in the developing countries that provide training and jobs to 
millions of people who would otherwise remain untrained and unemployed. These are 
often low wage ‘sweat shop’ jobs with no security, benefits, or decent working envi-
ronments. Chinese factories using rural migrants to support their export bonanza are no-
torious for such conditions.   
Still classified at large as a poor country, India has many millionaires, even billion-
aires of the Ambanis, Tatas, Birlas, and Mahindras fame aided and abetted by the 
global economy juggernaut. But vast numbers of Indians survive on a dollar a day 
without running water, power, toilets or telephones – services taken for granted almost 
everyone in the rich world. This can be said of millions of Chinese as well in the 
world's manufacturing powerhouse and its second largest economy.  
One significant measure of disparity is the so-called digital divide within and across 
nations. According to the International Telecommunications Union, 60 per cent inhabitants 
in the rich world had access to the Internet in 2007 compared to only 17 per cent in the 
less developed countries. Wide variations do indeed exist within nations as well. For 
example, China has 200+ million Internet users, the largest number in the world sur-
passing the Web surfers in the United States. But it is still a small percentage of the to-
tal population covering only about 13 per cent of the Chinese people next to 67 per cent 
in Japan, 66 per cent in South Korea, and 63 per cent in Taiwan. By and large, South 
Asian, Latin, and African populations have far less access to modern information tech-
nologies than the people in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and East 
Asia (Fairlie 2004).   
Nonetheless, Internet use has become a tool for economic development and social 
networking everywhere. Computers are providing vital information about commodities, 
markets, weather, technological innovations, and knowledge in general to entrepreneurs, 
farmers, businessmen, housewives, students and scholars in communities across the 
world. Where computers are unavailable, cell/mobile phones and television are filling the 
gap to some extent by connecting people to sources of knowledge and information within 
or outside an organization or a country. But when none of these information sources is 
available to large sections of a society, economic development suffers and along with it 
suffer the individuals, their families, and freedoms (Sen 1999; James 2003). 
Globalization by itself cannot narrow the digital divide and economic disparity. Nei-
ther can it accentuate them. National politics, prejudices, priorities, and ideologies deter-
mine the extent up to which nations, organizations, and communities may benefit the most 
or the least from the resources unleashed by the forces of globalization; like the opening 
of world markets to locally manufactured goods and services, access to international sci-
ence, technology, education, capital, and employment in offshore facilities. The tide often 
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does not lift all boats. Unprotected by public policies, the poor are generally left out of  
the massive sweeps of what could otherwise be positive social change. Examples are le-
gion to suggest that left to propel on their own momentum, technological innovations and 
markets end up helping the least those who need to be helped the most. Globalization in 
general can, therefore, be either a social and economic boon or a bane depending upon 
how it is managed locally (Stiglitz 2002). 
Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this discourse is to help create a better explanation of globalization by 
discounting some of the reigning misconceptions about its nature and impacts on global 
communities. Four such assumptions, called the fallacies of globalization, were briefly 
discussed and discounted. Why do we need a discourse of this nature about globaliza-
tion at this time? It is a good question that needs to be answered although most proba-
bly without satisfying either the proponents or opponents of globalizations. 
First and foremost is the reason that we are living in an increasingly interdependent 
and interconnected world driven by the engine of globalization. This juggernaut is go-
ing to be with us for all its promises and pitfalls whether we like it or not. Understand-
ing what globalization is and is not, what it does and does not do, or can or cannot do, 
is imperative for individuals, communities, corporations, and governments all across  
the globe, from Beijing to Bangalore, from Lhasa to Lahore. This discussion argues that 
globalization, possibly every aspect of it – from economy to politics, population, envi-
ronment, and the culture – has been continuing and gaining momentum for thousands 
of years before the Industrial Revolution, colonialism, world wars, and the post-World 
War II Bretton Woods institutions. In our contemporary globalizing world system there 
are many players, some more vital then others. Considering it anyhow otherwise mis-
construes globalization's true nature and tends to make it appear as an exclusively west-
ern creation and a unidirectional force driven by western corporations and their gov-
ernments and vested interests. Such misconceptions can easily lead to the conclusion 
that globalization is another name for westernization of the nonwestern world in the 
garb of modernization, democracy, and economic liberalization and therefore must be 
rejected by those who could actually benefit the most from it. 
The coming of the digital age is both a cause and consequence of globalization and 
its economic, cultural, political, technological, demographic, and environmental dimen-
sions. Digital technologies are connecting together an ever-increasing number of people 
of all colors and creeds, regions and nationalities. These connections and interactions 
promise to herald new virtual communities far beyond their national, cultural, and geo-
graphic boundaries. Goods, services, and agricultural commodities available in one cor-
ner of the world are being shipped and consumed in other corners. Their pace and reach 
is expected to increase by tenfold in this and the coming decades. Yet seeing modern 
information technologies simply as instruments of power over the powerless could lead 
to serious social, cultural, and political consequences by way of their misuse in crime, 
violence, exploitation, extortion, corruption, and other forms of irresponsible behavior 
such as violating other peoples' privacy. Forces unleashed by globalization could there-
fore be equally beneficial or harmful, a boon or bane for human societies depending 
upon how wisely or unwisely they are used.   
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Economic globalization being the most pervasive aspect of globalization needs to 
be understood and handled well by all concerned. Left unchecked it could pose serious 
environmental and social hazards. But to blame global economy per se as the fountain-
head of environmental degradation and socioeconomic disparity among people and 
communities of the world would be short-sighted. It is the unbridled and uncontrolled 
economic self-interest that is the source of our environmental quagmire and social ine-
qualities. What is needed are global consciousness and responsibility to safeguard the 
future of our planet and the people living on it. The repeated failures by nations at nu-
merous international forums and the United Nations to come to terms with the reality of 
a fast deteriorating environment and unfulfilled promise of meeting the 2000 Millen-
nium Development Goals testify to the fact that the required global consciousness is yet 
to take root among the power brokers of the world (Ahmad 2003). This essay warns of 
these and other consequences of globalization through the mirrors of four facts and fal-
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